

66096

1st Endorsement

CONFIDENTIAL
SERIAL PDNYF 04461

17 Battery Place, New York, N. Y.
October 31, 1942

From: The Port Director, Third Naval District.
To: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Report of Voyage S.S. ABANGAREZ
From Gourock, Scotland, to New York City.

4538 OT

1. Forwarded.
2. The following alterations will be effected in the ship's equipment, as requested:
 - a. Provide stowage for armed guard gear.
 - b. Provide stowage box for snowflakes.
 - c. Provide hasps and padlocks - magazine.
 - d. Sound powered telephone jack flying bridge.
 - e. Check battle phones; repair if necessary.

RECEIVED S-C FILES

Nov 4 1942

NOV 4 1942

ROUTE 10- 23

(12 file No (SC) A4-3/abangarez

Incl. No. _____
Page No. 1 of 1
Date _____

F. G. REINICKE,

By [Signature]

122



✓ E.C.C.
ACD ✓ TW

Confidential

October 29, 1942

FROM ; - COMMANDING OFFICER OF NAVAL ARMED GUARD
ON S.S. ABANGAREZ

TO ; - VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, VIA PORT DIRECTOR,
NEW YORK CITY.

SUBJECT ; - REPORT OF VOYAGE.

REFERENCE ; GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMMANDING OFFICERS OF
NAVAL ARMED GUARDS ON MERCHANT SHIPS, JULY 1, 1942,
PARAGRAPH 436.

(A) S.S. ABANGAREZ, FREIGHTER, 4538 GROSS TONS, NO CARGO,
OWNER, UNITED FRUIT COMPANY, CHARTERED TO WAR
SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION.

(B) DEPARTED FROM GOUROCK (CLYDE) SCOTLAND AT 18.00 ,
OCTOBER 10, 1942, IN CONVOY, OTHER SHIPS JOINED US THE
NEXT DAY, MAKING A TOTAL OF 42 SHIPS AND 6 ESCORTS,
CONVOY SPEED TO BE 9.5 KNOTS. ARRIVED NEW YORK
OCTOBER 29 1942 AT _____

(C) NO CONTACTS WITH ENEMY OBSERVED .

(D) MEMBER OF SHIP'S CREW DISAPPEARED DURING NIGHT OCTOBER
11-12, 1942. HEAVY STORMS CUT DOWN SPEED OF VESSEL FOR
SEVERAL DAYS TO 4-7 KNOTS, VESSEL CAPABLE OF 12.5
KNOTS. IN FIRST STORM, A FEW DAYS AFTER LEAVING PORT
FIVE (5) SHIPS DISAPPEARED AND WERE NOT SEEN AGAIN,
AFTER SECOND SEVERE STORM, ON NIGHT OF OCTOBER 17,
FOUR MORE SHIPS DISAPPEARED AND WERE NOT THEREAFTER
SEEN. DURING THE NIGHT AT ABOUT 20.00 S.S. ABANGAREZ
NARROWLY AVOIDED COLLISION WITH A TANKER OF THE CONVOY,
AT HEIGHT OF STORM SHIP'S OFFICERS HAD GREAT DIFFICULTY
KEEP SHIP ON COURSE, DUE, IT WAS SAID, TO LACK OF
BALLAST. RUNNING LIGHTS WERE SHOWN BY SHIPS ON SAME
NIGHT, AND SEVERAL SHIPS, INCLUDING ABANGAREZ, DISPLAYED
"OUT OF CONTROL" LIGHTS, SEVERAL SHIPS WERE OBSERVED TO
TURN AROUND AND HEAD IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO CONVOY
COURSE. THE NEXT MORNING WE HEARD BY RADIO OF A
SUBMARINE ATTACK CLOSE BY . IT IS PRESUMED THE ATTACK
WAS MADE ON SOME OF THE SHIPS OF THE CONVOY.
FOR SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THIS STORM ONLY TWO ESCORT SHIPS
WERE OBSERVED WITH THE CONVOY. ON OCTOBER 22 FOUR MORE
ESCORT SHIPS JOINED US . IN THE MEANTIME, MANY RADIO
REPORTS OF SUBMARINE ACTIVITY IN THE VICINITY WERE
RECEIVED. FOLLOWING THE STORM IT WAS FOUND THAT OUR
SHIP HAD SUFFERED A CRACKED MAIN SHAFT BEARING, NO
REPLACEMENTS WERE ON HAND . A TEMPORARY WOODEN SUPPORT
WAS ARRANGED. NO LIGHTS WERE SHOWN EXCEPT AS MENTIONED
ABOVE, AND EXCEPT FOR BLUE STERN LIGHTS IN FOG.
LEADING SHIPS BLEW THEIR WHISTLES WHEN COMMODORE DID.
FOG BUOYS WERE USED BY ALL BUT LAST SHIPS IN COLUMNS.

COURSE WAS CHANGED WHEN ORDERED BY COMMODORE, NUMEROUS, AND AT TIMES DRASTIC CHANGES WERE MADE.

(E) NONE, EXCEPT USUAL CONVOY INSTRUCTIONS.

(F) YES.

(G) 4" 50 CAL. GUN AND AFTER 20 MM GUNS ARE BEING SERIOUSLY DAMAGED BY GREAT VIBRATION OF AFTER END OF SHIP. THIS VIBRATION IS BAD ENOUGH AT ORDINARY TIMES WHEN THE PROPELLER IS UNDER THE SURFACE, BUT WHEN THE PROPELLER COMES WHOLLY OR PARTIALLY OUT OF WATER WHEN THE SHIP PITCHES IT IS TERRIFIC. SOME MEANS SHOULD BE FOUND TO ELIMINATE OR AT LEAST DIMINISH THIS VIBRATION. 20 MM AMMUNITION APPEARS TO BE DEFECTIVE. STOPPAGES IN 20 MM GUNS HAVE OCCURRED, DUE, APPARENTLY, TO PRIMERS BECOMING DETACHED FROM EJECTED CARTRIDGES AND WEDGING THEMSELVES BETWEEN FACE PIECE AND PRIMER OF LIVE CARTRIDGE, THUS PREVENTING FIRING PIN STRIKING HARD ENOUGH TO EXPLODE.

*Either
rebuild
this ship
or retain
the AG
officer
with a
sagging
officer.
ECC*

LOCKERS SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO OUTSIDE OF GUN PLATFORMS. AT PRESENT, NO LOCKERS OF ANY KIND ARE PROVIDED, THUS ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT HAS TO BE PUT IN WHATEVER CONTAINERS THAT MAY BE AVAILABLE OR LEFT IN THE MOUNTS. IN ACTION THEY WOULD BE IN THE WAY. IN ROUGH WEATHER IT IS DIFFICULT TO SECURE THE VARIETY OF ARTICLES.

A SHELTER BELOW THE 4" 50 GUN MOUNT SHOULD BE PROVIDED. IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY SIMPLE TO MAKE. SOME SUCH SHELTER IS IMPERATIVE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC WINTER TO BRING THE 20 MM GUNS TO FOR OVERHAULING. TO CLEAN THE GUNS IN THE MOUNTS IN THE CONSTANT RAIN, SPRAY AND WIND, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE PITCHING AND ROLLING OF THE SHIP, IT IS WELL NIGH IMPOSSIBLE. CATWALKS SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED FROM THE FLYING BRIDGE TO THE FORWARD 20 MM MOUNTS.

A STEEL SHELTER SHOULD BE CONSTRUCTED ON THE FLYING BRIDGE FOR USE OF THE SIGNALMAN AND THE ARMED GUARD OFFICER, SUCH A PROTECTION IS ESSENTIAL AS A PROTECTION BOTH AGAINST THE WEATHER AND IN AIRPLANE ATTACK. IT SHOULD ALSO AFFORD A PLACE TO STOW ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT.

(H) YES, AS FAR AS COULD BE OBSERVED.

*(I)
Armed guards
will stay in
A-G service
for which they
have been specially
trained.
ECC*

ARMED GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD AFTER A REASONABLE PERIOD OF SERVICE BE GIVEN THE CHANCE TO JOIN THE FLEET. WITHOUT SOME HOPE OF THIS, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THOSE MEN WHO NEVER SAW SERVICE WITH THE FLEET TO REALIZE THAT THEY ARE REALLY NAVY. CONSTANT CONTACT WITH MERCHANT CREWS WILL HAVE IN SPITE OF ALL EFFORTS TO THE CONTRARY BY THOSE IN CHARGE, THE EFFECT OF DULLING THE ARMED GUARDSMANS FEELING OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE NAVY AND CAUSE HIM TO WONDER WHY HE IS SHARING THE SAME RISKS OF MERCHANT CREW MEN FOR ABOUT 1/5 OF THE MONEY THEY GET.

(J) NONE.

RESPECTFULLY,
Edward G. Maglano, Lt (jg) USNR