

NYIU-HLA-not
CONFIDENTIAL

YARD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
NAVY YARD, S. C.

October 17, 1942.

COPY

BOARDING REPORT

Subject: TUG CUMCO --- Boarding of.

Sources: Lieutenant Gordon D. KISSAM, USNR, Commanding Officer,
U.S.S. RUBY (PY-21); O. W. STEEN-FIRING, Master of
TUG CUMCO.

REPORT:

1. This report covers investigation for the particular purpose of determining cause of delay of SUBJECT Tug leaving Southport, N.C. while under Navy orders to proceed.

2. SYNOPSIS OF INVESTIGATION: SUBJECT Tug received Navy orders 0023 October 16, 1942 Southport, N. C. to tow U.S.S. RUBY Charleston, S. C.; three members of crew - two firemen, one oiler -- complaining of sickness demanded to be paid off in Southport; immediate examination of complaining firemen and oiler revealed normal temperature and pulse; remainder of engine room crew refused to sail from Southport with Navy replacements for absent engine room crewmen. When confronted by Naval officials Southport, engine room crew agreed to sail, denied previous refusal to sail. U.S.S. RUBY, after delay due to refusal of crew to sail, was brought to Charleston by SUBJECT Tug with Armed Guard aboard Tug and Naval replacements for engine room crewmen signed off. Investigation indicates 2nd Mate George O. C. MIDGETT and Chief Engineer Branson B. HALL undesirable members of crew. Second Mate George O. C. MIDGETT, insubordinate, leading trouble maker; Chief Engineer Branson B. HALL also trouble maker. SUBJECT Tug now in Navy Yard, S. C. awaiting orders. Captain of Tug reports information from Chief Engineer that engine trouble, nature unknown, renders Tug unseaworthy without repairs; Production Department, Navy Yard, S. C. inspecting engines to determine true conditions due to questionable reliability of Chief Engineer. Report on engine conditions follows.

DEDUCTIONS: Investigation indicates:

(1) Second Mate, George O. C. MIDGETT, is the instigator of trouble among crew members of TUG CUMCO; his past conduct includes insubordination, agitation of crew and attempt to undermine confidence in Master of Tug; is undesirable member of crew and desirability for sea duty any ship is questionable.

(2) Chief Engineer, Branson B. HALL, is jointly responsible for agitating members of crew, particularly those in engine room department; was instrumental in delaying departure of TUG CUMCO from Southport, N.C. October 16, 1942; has failed to cooperate with Master of Tug, thereby impeding operations of the Tug; is undesirable member of this crew.

COPY

O. W. Steam-Firing, Master of the Tug CUMCO, signed the following statement:
 TUG CUMCO -- Refusal of Crew to leave Southport for Charleston, S.C. October 16, 1942

 DEDUCTIONS, cont'd:

(3) Three crewmen - Cleophas CASHY, Oiler; John B. TUGGLE, Fireman; and Leroy SHUMAN, Fireman -- feigned sickness Southport, N. C., thereby delaying departure of TUG CUMCO from Southport, N. C.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That George O. C. MIDGETT, Second Mate on SUBJECT Tug, be removed from this ship and consideration given to his unfitness for sea duty on any ship.

(2) That the Chief Engineer, Branson B. HALL, be removed from this ship, severely reprimanded, strongly warned as to his future conduct and consideration given to suspension of his Engineer's license for a period of time.

Southport, N.C. and take the U.S.S. RUBY in tow to Charleston. We proceeded towards Southport at 7:35 on Friday morning, arriving at Southport at 0800, Friday morning.

Shortly after we had docked at Southport a Navy Lieutenant came aboard with orders from Operations Officer, USN, to Southern Base, Southport, N.C. reading as follows: "Direct Tug CUMCO to Southport with U.S.S. RUBY in tow and escort by U.S.S. COLESLI (name) (name)." A copy of the order is attached hereto and make a part of this statement.

DETAILS FOLLOW

Just before the Lieutenant came aboard three men, two firemen and an oiler, all colored, came to me and asked to be paid off; they demanded to be paid off, claiming they were sick. I told them that they were not sick and they could proceed to Charleston. When the Lieutenant came aboard we called these three up and examined them. They were then sent ashore and ranged from 98.2 to 99 and their pulse was from 70 to 80. Their names are: Oiler, Cleophas Cashy, Fireman John Tuggle, and Fireman Leroy Shuman.

Boarding Officers:

Lt. Cmdr. Ernest Burwell, USNR.

Lt. Henry Anderson, USNR.

Lt. W. T. Morton, USNR.

I talked the matter over with the Lieutenant and decided it was better to pay them off and get rid of them.

I previously had an agreement with the crew, both deck and engine room, which was approved by Commander Hall who was in charge of operations of the CUMCO, that since we were on two hours sailing notice in Norfolk, we could let two firemen and one oiler go ashore for twenty-four hours at a time, remaining aboard for 48 hours, and in the event we would have to sail that there would be enough men aboard to run the engine room department, and there would be no argument about overtime or anything like that. It was an arrangement for the benefit of the crew.

O. W. Steen-Firing, Master of the Tug CUMCO, signed the following statement:

"The home port of the Tug CUMCO is Norfolk, Va., but we left Norfolk on the 10th of September, under orders from the Commandant, 5th Naval District, to report to the Commandant of the Naval Base at Morehead City, North Carolina.

On Sunday, October 11, 1942, I received orders from the Commandant at the Navy Section Base at Morehead City to have ship ready to leave on very short notice. In accordance with these orders I went aboard and gave the 1st Assistant Engineer the orders I had received. His name is J. B. Alexander. He said if you just give me a little time, I'll be ready to leave on 20 minutes notice. As a result of the orders I received, all liberty was cancelled for the ship's company. The Chief Mate later reported that he had collected all liberty passes from the crew.

On Monday I received orders to proceed to Lookout Bight and anchor to await further orders. I left the dock at 2 P.M. sharp on Monday, the 12th of October. We laid at anchor at Lookout Bight until Thursday morning. On Wednesday night a Navy Lieutenant (Lieut. (jg)) came aboard with orders to proceed to Southport, N.C. and take the U.S.S. RUBY in tow to Charleston. We proceeded towards Southport at 7:08 on Thursday morning, arriving at Southport at 0023, Friday morning.

Shortly after we had docked at Southport a Navy Lieutenant came aboard with orders from Operations Officer, OND, to Section Base, Southport, N.C. reading as follows: "Direct Tug COMCO to depart Southport with U.S.S. RUBY in tow and escort by U.S.S. CGC131 immediately upon arrival." A copy of the order is attached hereto and made a part of this statement.

Just before the Lieutenant came aboard three men, two firemen and an oiler, all colored, came to me and asked to be paid off, they demanded to be paid off, claiming they were sick. I told them that they were not sick and they could proceed to Charleston. When the Lieutenant came aboard we called these three up and examined them. Their temperatures were taken and ranged from 98.2 to 99 and their pulse was from 78 to 82. Their names are: Oiler, Cleophus Cosby, Firemen John Tuggle and Leroy Shuman.

I talked the matter over with the Lieutenant and we decided it was better to pay them off and get rid of them.

I previously had an agreement with the crew, both deck and engine room, which was approved by Commander Hull who was in charge of operations of the CUMCO, that since we were on two hours sailing notice in Norfolk, we could let two firemen and one oiler go ashore for twenty-four hours at a time, remaining aboard for 48 hours, and in the event we would have to sail that there would be enough men aboard to man the engine room department, and there would be no argument about overtime or anything like that. It was an arrangement for the benefit of the crew.

Prior to this incident between Morehead City, Southport, and Charleston, on another

In view of this agreement, we decided that paying the three men off, the two firemen and one oiler, would make no difference.

The Lieutenant and I immediately went to the U.S.S. RUBY after we had examined the firemen and oiler. There the Captain of the RUBY told me that he would furnish men to replace the firemen and oiler. Plans were then made to depart at 0300, Friday, providing that replacement of the men by Navy personnel was agreeable on the ship.

Upon returning to the ship I told the Chief Engineer what had been agreed upon and he said "Okay". The Chief Engineer's name is Bransson B. Hall. About five minutes later he came back to my quarters and told me that "they refused to go to sea with an inexperienced crew." He said the firemen and oilers refused to go to sea. He had no way of knowing whether the Navy replacements were experienced or not. He told me that he was going to put Joe Johnson, an oiler, in charge of the engine room for the night and that I must agree to pay him overtime for that work. I don't recall exactly what I said to him but I did say that this matter would have to be straightened out by the Navy as I had no authority to make any further arrangements. I then went ashore and called Lieut. Commander Haskell, Commander of the Section Base in Southport. After explaining things to him, he told me to go and get some rest and that he would call me in the morning. At 0800, or shortly after, a launch came alongside in charge of a Lieutenant and he had orders for me to proceed to the Naval (Section) base. We left immediately and upon arrival at the Section Base, I met Commander Haskell, Captain Burnett (USCG) and the Captain of the Ruby and his Executive Officer. They had a telephone conversation with what I presumed was the Commandant in Charleston and the Captain of the Port in Wilmington and it was decided to send Capt. Burnett with an armed guard on board the tug CUNCO to investigate. This was done and the crew agreed to go to sea with the Navy men aboard. Each of the men in the crew were asked individually if they refused to work or go to sea and, of course, to the Captain each denied that they had ever refused, and agreed to go to sea.

We left Southport Government Dock at 1230, picked up the Ruby, and with replacements from the Ruby, an armed guard crew aboard, and the executive officer of the RUBY aboard, we proceeded to Charleston, arriving without further event. After we arrived in Charleston this morning, Saturday, at about 0830, the Chief Engineer came up to me and said "We do not refuse to work, remember that, but if you have to get a new crew here to take the ship to Norfolk, you can get the whole engine room department, Chief, 1st and 2nd Assistant as we are all quitting." The first assistant is at present in the Norfolk Hospital. His name is J. B. Alexander, we having sent him ashore with an injured hand on Thursday morning before leaving Lookout Light, so I can not understand how the Chief Engineer was speaking for him. I told him to make his report to the Navy because I had no authority to pay the men off. My orders from Captain Burnett and Commander Haskell in Southport were to pay no more men off. (W. H. Barnett, USCG, Southport, N.C.)

It is my understanding from the Chief Engineer that the engines need repairs. Prior to this incident between Morehead, Southport, and Charleston, on another

occasion, during September when we were towing the Yacht Mayflower to Wilmington to Morehead City, the exact date of which I cannot remember, I had trouble with the 2nd Mate, George O. C. Midgett. While we were towing the Mayflower, we received information on our ship to shore telephone that submarines were located at a given point which was around Cape Lookout Light. Our course would have been in this vicinity. When the 2nd mate heard this he said "this is just as good an excuse as any to anchor right here where we are."

I said, "Are you crazy, do you think I can anchor here on the report I got without authority from the Navy?" He said, "Authority hell, the majority want you to anchor". He was on watch and I left him at the pilot house. I got in touch with the Chief Mate and told him to see that all of the crew had their life belts. I inquired of various members of the crew as to how they felt, and they said nothing at all about being afraid to go on. I went back on the bridge and Midgett said, "Are you going to anchor or are you not?" I told him I was going to proceed to sea and if you want me to I will call our escort, he may be put you ashore or you may stay with them. He said: "You are just stubborn and want everything your own way. You are not only risking the life of everybody on this ship but also on the Yacht Mayflower." I did not answer him anything. Nothing further occurred and we proceeded to Morehead City without incident.

At the time I received orders in Morehead City on Sunday to stand by for immediate departure from Morehead City and I had all the liberty passes taken up, the 2nd mate said that the general opinion of the ship's crew is that "it is not navy orders but you." I answered him: "I suppose the 'general opinion' in this case is like it was with the anchoring of the Mayflower." He did not reply.

In general the 2nd Mate has been a trouble maker on board ever since he has been on board the ship. He came aboard Sept. 4th. I feel that if it had not been for the fact that I have a stepson in the deck crew, Custer Tsikures, and others that seemed to be on my side, that the 2nd mate might have influenced them against me. Many on the ship tell me that the 2nd Mate is trying to get my job but that hasn't concerned me in the least.

So far as the chief engineer is concerned I have nothing specifically against him only he does not cooperate at all. He did not respond to bell signals very promptly. One instance was when docking in Wilmington, N.C. at the time we were going to pick up the Mayflower when I had to give him four signals for full astern before he would respond. It is my understanding that the Chief Engineer is going to quit when we get back to Norfolk.

With respect to the 2nd Mate, I do not believe that he is desirable aboard this ship because of his general troublesome nature, talk, and the specific instances referred to above.

It is my understanding from the Chief Engineer that the engines need repairs before any other tow jobs are undertaken. The specific trouble with the engines

The deck officers belong to the Master, Mate and Pilots Association; the Engineers to the M.M.B. Association; the rest belong to the International Seafarer's Union, all affiliated with the A.F. of L. There is no agitation from a Union point of view aboard the ship.

ET VER GULDE INDELIJKE WROU AMEN/s/ O. W. Steen-Pirng.

/s/ Henry L. Anderson, Lieutenant, USNR.

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U.S.S. RUBY

October 18, 1942

Section Base, Southport, N. C.
NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

info.

Heading:

RECEIVED BY PHONE FROM OPERATIONS OFFICER SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Action:

From: OPERATIONS OFFICER, 6ND

TO: SECTION BASE, SOUTHPORT, N. C.

DIRECT TUG COMCO TO DEPART SOUTHPORT WITH USS RUBY IN TOW AND ESCORT
BY USS GGC131 IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL

4. The master of the tug ~~COMCO~~ was informed that two of his firemen and
one other refused to work on the tug and were paid off at Southport.
I offered to replace them with USS ~~personnel~~. This offer
was accepted. THIS DATE ~~done~~ BY WILMINGS

5. Shortly after 0800 a message was received (ES) from the Section Base
stating that the tug ~~COMCO~~ would not be ready to depart before 0800.
At 0840 the GGC 131 tied up alongside having completed (COPY)
fuel and the captain received routing instructions from us.

C.O.	EXEC.	GUNNERY	COMM.	REPAIR	MEDICAL	SUPPLY
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6. At 0745 the tug ~~COMCO~~ was informed that the Executive Officer
was requested from the Section Base to take the tug to the Executive Officer
and as to the tug. The master being aware we spoke to the Second
Mate who informed us that the tug's engine room crew refused to go to
sea if Navy personnel were not aboard to replace the three members
of the tug's crew who had been paid off, because they were not mem-
bers of their union. He further volunteered the information that
the master was a squarehead, did not know how to handle the crew and
unnecessarily denied them liberty while in Norfolk, Va., having
taken the tug out in Lynnhaven Roads for three days while there.

7. The master was discovered where trying to hire some new hands.
The Executive Officer and I proceeded to the Section Base in order
to inform Operations of the situation and to request authority to
place an armed guard on the tug and proceed immediately to Char-
leston.

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U.S.S. RUBY

October 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM REPORT ON TROUBLE EXPERIENCED IN GETTING TUG CUMCO UNDERWAY TO TOW THIS SHIP FROM SOUTHPORT TO CHARLESTON IN COMPLIANCE WITH OPERATION ORDER TO GET UNDERWAY IMMEDIATELY UPON HER ARRIVAL AT SOUTHPORT.

3. Commanding Officer of the local Coast Guard Station.

1. At 2245 tug Cumco stood up the channel and passed close aboard and was followed some 15 minutes later by the CGC 131. Attempt was made to contact both the tug and the CGC 131 by searchlight without results, it being desirable to carry out telephone operations orders to the Cumco via Section Base at the earliest possible moment.

RUBY to call the vessel.

2. Both these two vessels proceeded to Southport and tied up to docks. After a reasonable period of waiting and subsequent attempt to contact them by searchlight, without result, an HP boat was requested to transfer me to the tug. However at 0020 the HP2 came alongside with the master of the tug.

3. Arrangements were made to have the tug come alongside at 0300 and begin towing operations. Arrangements were also made to have the CGC 131 fueled for the return trip to Charleston from drums at the Section Base. Officer and the Engineer were the trouble-makers, and had probably been the instigators of the situation.

4. The master of the tug informed me that two of his firemen and one oiler refused to continue and were to be paid off at Southport. I offered to replace these men with USS RUBY personnel. This offer was accepted.

5. Shortly after 0200 a message was received from the Section Base stating that the tug Cumco would not be ready to depart before 0600. At 0440 the CGC 131 tied up alongside having completed taking on fuel and the captain received routing instructions from us.

6. At 0745 there being no sign of activity on the tug a motor launch was requested from the Section Base to take the Executive Officer and me to the tug. The master being ashore we spoke to the Second Mate who informed us that the tug's engine room force refused to go to sea if Navy personnel were put aboard to replace the three members of the tugs crew who had been paid off, because they were not members of their union. He further volunteered the information that the master was a squarehead, did not know how to handle the crew and unnecessarily denied them liberty while in Norfolk, Va., having taken the tug out in Lynhaven Roads for three days while there.

7. The master was discovered ashore trying to hire some new hands. The Executive Officer and I proceeded to the Section Base in order to inform Operations of the situation and to request authority to place an armed guard on the tug and proceed immediately to Charleston.

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U.S.S. RUBY

October 18, 1942

8. Commanding Officer of the Section Base then contacted Operations and the Commanding Officer of the local Coast Guard Station, who arrived with an armed guard of four men. After a meeting including him and the master of the tug we returned with the master to the tug and the crew was ably questioned by the Commanding Officer of the Coast Guard station, the result being that the crew agreed to proceed to Charleston and accept additional men from the USS RUBY to fill the vacancies.

9. The Cumco came alongside at 1230. An oiler and four firemen were put aboard together with an armed guard of six men, including two petty officers, all in charge of the RUBY's Executive Officer. All the men placed aboard were volunteers for this duty.

NOTE: During the questioning of the crew it became evident that the Second Officer and the Engineer were the trouble-makers, and had probably been the instigators of the disention.

/s/ Gordon D. KISSAM
GORDON D. KISSAM

1	John W. Kinsinger	120157	120715	41 U.S.A.
2	George O. Cunningham	120709	120829	"
3	John W. Kinsinger	120709	120829	"
4	Cash Tolson (1)	120709	120829	"
5	Ernest B. Hall	120709	120829	"
6	Albert Palmer	120709	120829	"
7	William Jackson (D-1)	120709	120829	"
8	Joe Johnson (D-1)	120709	120829	"
9	Clonahs Cancy	120709	120829	"
10	Ray Williams	120709	120829	"
11	John B. Tuggle	120709	120829	"
12	Andrew Buckhouse	120709	120829	"
13	Archibald Perkins	120709	120829	"

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ENCLOSURE

REPORT OF SHIP PERSONNEL NOT SHIPPED OR DISCHARGED BEFORE A UNITED STATES

SHIPPING COMMISSIONER

Persons composing the crew of the SS Tug Cumca, Official Number of Ship 217888, Voyage No. _____, Port of Southport, N.C., Date, October 15th, 1942, Description of voyage, Coastwise, Owner or operator and address, Eastern Transportation Company, Bank of Commerce Bldg., Norfolk, Va., Master Ole W. Steen - Hing 149613. City _____ St. Norfolk, Va.

Line No.	Christian Names and Surname in Full of Each Member of the Crew.	Book or License Certificate of Registry, Identification No.	Age	Citizen or Subject of	Capacity	Date and Place of Engagement	Address
1	John W. Niemeyer	137187	158715	41 U.S.A.	1stmate	8/20-42 Norfolk, Va.	503N.St.Portsmouth Virginia
2	George O.C.Midgett	115376	163209	35 "	2nd "	9/4-42 Little Creek	719 Pine St. Norfolk, Va.
3	John F. McMahan	2-245422	230-01-4293	20 "	A.B.	9/1-42 Little Creek	1330W. 27th St. Norfolk, Va.
4	Casta Toikures (D1)	Z187291	E397838	19 "	O.S.	9/25-42 Morehead City	1600 Cedar St. Norfolk, Va.
5	Bransan B. Hall	116144	194967	50 "	Chief Eng	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	42 York Apts. Norfolk, Va.
6	Albert Palmer	135208	180730	50 "	2nd Ass. Eng.	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	339 Elm Place Norfolk, Va.
7	Hiscan Jackson (D-1)	Z245534	C1104973	38 "	Oiler	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	226 Kent St. Norfolk, Va.
8	Joe Johnson (D-1)	Z245534	C104993	52 "	"	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	803 Wide, St. Norfolk, Va.
9	Cleaphas Cascy	Z122349	C36307	48 "	"	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	727 Burris St. Norfolk, Va.
10	Mayo Williams	Z200493	C16863	49 "	Fireman	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	1209 Pike St. Norfolk, Va.
11	John B. Tuggle	Z245553	C52166	47 "	"	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	1902 Fulton St. Brooklyn, N.Y.
12	Mathew Buckhouse	Z245195	C16629	54 "	"	9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	2 Jone's Place Norfolk, Va.
13	Archie Perkins	Z245346	D-2,C,90320	42 "	"	9/7-42 Little Creek, Va.	117 Blackenham St. Jacksonville, Fla.

ENCLOSURE "D"

14	Heray Shuman	2226275	C78990	42	"	Fireman 9/25-42 Morehead City N.C.	1728 Van Buren Jacksonville, Fla.
15	Alexander Kinsey	2245430	C84394	49	"	Fireman 9/25 42 Morehead City N.C.	908 Waven St. Norfolk, Va.
16	Lonnie Kallock	2203592	E585290	47	"	Steward 9/1-42 Little Creek, Va.	1248 Armstrong St. Norfolk, Va.
17	Edith Kallock (D-1)	Z285643	E385292	31	"	Steward-9/1-42 Little Creek, Va. est	1248 Armstong St. Norfolk, Va.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

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TUG CUMCO -- Boarding of -- YARD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

October 20, 1942

NYIU-HIA-met -- -- -- -- -- NAVY YARD, S. C. -- -- -- -- --

Serial No. NY-016

CONFIDENTIAL, in Charleston.

Subject: TUG CUMCO -- Boarding of -- (Supplemental Report).

Source: Lieutenant Commander W. L. MALONEY, USCG, Captain of the Port, Charleston, S. C.

Reference: (a) Boarding report, same Subject, October 17, 1942.

REPORT: Interview with Chief Engineer, Benjamin B. Hall was deemed unnecessary.

Information received from Lieutenant Commander W. L. MALONEY, USCG, Captain of the Port, Charleston, S. C. discloses that SUBJECT Tug was boarded and Second Mate George O. C. MIDGETT and Master of the Tug, O. W. STEEN-FIRING were interviewed, however, interview of MIDGETT was "unofficial", according to Lieutenant Commander MALONEY and no formal testimony was taken.

2. Lieutenant Commander MALONEY stated that from information obtained from MIDGETT, it appeared that lengthy investigation would be necessary to get to the bottom of the trouble aboard this ship, and in view of the Master's desire to leave Charleston as soon as possible, MIDGETT was not removed from the ship.

3. Lieutenant Commander MALONEY also stated that the Second Mate, MIDGETT, made statements which implied that the Master of the Tug was incompetent. Lieutenant Commander MALONEY also expressed the opinion that from interview of the Master of the Tug and MIDGETT, he received the impression that there was a clash of personalities of the Master and the Second Mate. MIDGETT was warned by Lieutenant Commander MALONEY and copy of Reference (a), together with copy of Memorandum to the Captain of the Port signed by Ensign Ben ANDERSON, USCGR, October 17, 1942, were forwarded to the Captain of the Port, Morehead City, N. C. by the following endorsement:

1st Indorsement
661-42-CONFIDENTIAL
CHARLESTON BASE
Charleston, S. C.
19 October, 1942

From: Captain of the Port, Charleston, S. C.

To: Captain of the Port, Morehead City, N. C.

Enclosures: (A) Memorandum to Captain of the Port, Charleston, signed by Ensign Ben Anderson, (USCGR), 17 October, 1942.

to see because (B) Boarding Report on Tug CUMCO, dated 17 October, 1942, undermined the crew.

file NYIU-HIA-met-CONFIDENTIAL.

"1. Forwarded for your information and appropriate action.

He has been mainly responsible for stirring up agitation in the engine room.

"2. The Master, O. W. Steen-Firing and Second Mate George O. C. Midgett were interviewed, but facts elicited were insufficient for Midgett's removal

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ENCLOSURE "E"

TUG CUMCO -- Boarding of -- (Supplemental Report)

October 20, 1942

 at this time in Charleston.

"3. It is suggested that you contact the Master of the vessel upon its arrival in your jurisdiction, so that this matter may be followed, in case Midgett causes more trouble on the trip from Charleston to Morehead City, N. C. In the event that Midgett has caused further trouble, it is recommended that he be removed upon proper investigation. This action is deemed advisable as to cause Midgett's activities to be reflected in his record, in addition to his being paid off by the Master. He is afraid to come out of the engine room and he feels that if we talk with these two men they will create more trouble on the return trip."

"4. Interview with Chief Engineer, Branson B. Hall was deemed unnecessary. Please also inquire regarding his activities on the trip back to Morehead City from Charleston, so as to complete record."

"5. Tug 'CUMCO' is expected to depart Charleston 1800 this date and upon proceed to Morehead City, North Carolina."

W. L. MALONEY, Lt. Comdr. USCG

4. Memorandum from Ensign Ben ANDERSON to Lieutenant Commander MALONEY is quoted herewith: "I am the Captain of the Port, Charleston, S. C. in order to complete report on this investigation and Coast Guard action which follows."

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
 POST OFFICE BOX 855
 CHARLESTON, S. C.

Boarding Office

17 October, 1942.

"Memorandum to Lt. Comm. Maloney.

CONFIDENTIAL:

"In accordance with orders received, an investigation was made on board the Tug CUMCO this date. Those making the investigation were Ensign Anderson, Yeoman Kawocki; Mr. Scott of Zone Intelligence also accompanied us."

"First, an interview with Lt. Comm. Burwell of Yard Intelligence was held and we were furnished with a copy of their boarding report. (Inclosure).

"O. W. STEEN-PIRING, Master of the Tug CUMCO, was the only person interviewed. He told how the Second Mate, GEORGE O. C. MIDGETT, was the main instigator of crew trouble and said it was his opinion that MIDGETT was afraid to go to sea because he had been ashore so long. He has been insubordinate and has undermined the crew's confidence in the Master."

"The Chief Engineer, Branson B. Hall, is also an undesirable crew member. He has been mainly responsible for stirring up agitation in the engine room."

TUG CUMCO -- Boarding of -- (Supplemental Report)

October 20, 1942

"He constantly complains of the engine needing repairs when he knows that repair facilities are not available and always infers that each trip will be the tug's last.

"Regardless of the trouble being caused by these two men, the Master requested that the Coast Guard not even interview them, but that he be given the chance to lay the facts before his association. His main reason for this request is that he is afraid he cannot get replacements in Charleston and he feels that if we talk with these two men they will create more trouble on the return trip. He also feels that he stands a better chance to regain the confidence in the crew if the Association backs him up.

"In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that DCGO 5th Naval District be advised of our action, so that further action can be taken at that point upon the Tug's return to Norfolk.

/s/ BEN ANDERSON, Ensign, USCGR"

5. Intelligence Officer, Navy Yard, S. C. has requested further information from Port Director, Morehead City, N. C. via Captain of the Port, Charleston, S. C. in order to complete report on this investigation and Coast Guard action which follows.

6. Boarding Officer -- H. L. Anderson, Lieutenant, USNR.

ERNEST BURWELL
Lt. Comdr., USNR
Yard Intelligence Officer.

COAST GUARD INTELLIGENCE

SIXTH NAVAL DISTRICT

LEADS NO 422-424

YACHTMASTER HOTEL

CHARLESTON, S. C.

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