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IN REPLY REFER TO INITIALS AND No.

EF13-7/P13
Serial 0479/tb

OFFICE OF U. S. NAVAL OBSERVER
BASRA, IRAQ

RECEIVED ONI MAIL ROOM

OS/Edward Livingston
1944 SEP 22 AM 7 57

CONFIDENTIAL

13 Sept. 1944

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From: U. S. Naval Observer, Basra, Iraq.
To: U. S. Coast Guard, Merchant Marine Detail.
Via: Director of Naval Intelligence.

Subject: SS EDWARD LIVINGSTON - friction in crew of.

- Enclosures: *W*
RL
- (A) U.S.C.G. Merchant Marine Detail, Khorramshahr, Iran, Case No. 628-50, SS EDWARD LIVINGSTON.
 - (B) Further interrogation, Case No. 628-50 by British 73 Field Security Section.
 - (C) Statements referred to in enclosure (A), par. 5.

1. Enclosures (B) and (C) contain further information bearing on enclosure (A), obtained by this office.

[Signature]
C. E. PERRY

END-1 on Alusnob Basra, Iraq, conf. ltr., EF13-7/P13, Serial 0479/tb, re SS EDWARD LIVINGSTON, dated 13 September 1944.

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Op-16-B-5
QSI/EDWARD LIVINGSTON
CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 01881416

23 SEP 1944

From: Director of Naval Intelligence
To: Intelligence Officer, U. S. Coast Guard.

1. Forwarded, as coming under the cognizance of the U. S. Coast Guard.

[Signature]
H. A. BURCH,
By direction.

*File: H. Edward Livingston (2)
X Basra, Iraq (1)
inv.*

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...the security of the in-
...contained herein, please
...return to Intelligence in-
...thing when it has served its purpose.

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(4)

Case No. 628-50 Khorramshahr
s.s. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

United States Coast Guard
Merchant Marine Detail
Khorramshahr, Iran
10 September, 1944

IN THE MATTER OF LICENSE OF RICHARD LACY WHITE, Third Assistant Engineer, Temporary Permit to Act in the Capacity of Third Assistant Engineer #16486, Certificate of Service No. C-102186, (Z-272455)

SOURCE OF COMPLAINT: Captain Raley, master of the S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON.

1. FACTS: On 29 August, 1944 the United States Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detail at Khorramshahr, Iran made a contact with Captain Raley of the S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON at Bandar Shahpur in response to a request for investigation from the British C.I.C.I. Through this contact Lt.(jg) Joseph F. Weiler presented three alternative courses of action to the master, each leading to a possible satisfactory solution of the difficulty.
2. These difficulties, according to the master's recitation to Lt.(jg) Weiler, were concerned with the activities of one Richard Lacy White, third assistant engineer on the S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON. The captain indicated that the chief engineer felt he could not trust White in the engine room because he had alleged that White had been responsible for permitting the evaporators to run water with a high salt content into the tanks, subsequently requiring a jettisoning of 42 tons of evaporated water. The chief engineer further alleged to the captain that the third assistant engineer threatened to assault the chief engineer and had, at times, used abusive language impugning his character and authority. It was further alleged by the captain that the chief engineer stated that the third assistant advised an oiler to leave a small amount of oil in the crosshead bearing so that the bearing would be cool when the third assistant got off watch, but would get hot on the next watch.
3. The captain stated that the chief engineer was under a terrific nervous strain and made frequent accusations to him relating to the inefficiencies and personal frictions developing in the engine room.
4. The captain's immediate difficulty seemed to center around a friction between the third assistant engineer and the chief engineer to the extent that the captain stoutly maintained he would refuse to sail his ship from the port of Bandar Shahpur with Third Assistant White aboard.
5. On 2 September, 1944 Richard Lacy White signed off the S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON by mutual consent and he arrived at Khorramshahr, Iran that same day, where he was subjected to close questioning concerning his relationships with the master and chief engineer, as well as his activities while on board ship. White maintained, and claimed to be able to present witnesses in his behalf, that the allegations of the captain had little basis in fact and further stated that he had never threatened to assault the chief engineer, nor was he responsible for allowing the salt water to get into the reserve feed tanks. He stated that he tasted the water and told the chief engineer that the water coming from the discharge of the evaporator was salty and that the chief engineer tasted the water and declared that it was not salty. He further stated that the chief engineer was a tyrant in the engine room and had frequently forced signed statements from other members of the engine room crew.

(5) ENCLOSURE (A)

Case No. 628-50 Khorramshahr
10 September, 1944

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

6. Because the second assistant engineer does not hold a license and is therefore "riding" on the license of the chief engineer and because White will be replaced by raising an oiler to the position of third assistant engineer, it is felt that the undue domination of the men in the engine room by the chief engineer will be continued, if not strengthened, during the remainder of the voyage to the detriment of the harmony and efficient operation of the ship.

7. It was revealed further that the S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON is the captain's first assignment as master, while the chief engineer has been attached to the White company for a number of years; this circumstance further tends to increase the domination of the entire ship by the chief engineer.

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: The evidence is insufficient to prove that the third assistant engineer is guilty of any acts under Section 4450 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, and it is recommended that no action be taken against his license. It is further recommended that the activities of the chief engineer be fully investigated by the U. S. Coast Guard Merchant Marine Detail in the next available port.

On August 13, 1944, the 2nd Assistant Engineer, George W. English, did not come down to relieve the watch until 12:00 Noon. This made the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, angry and he said, "I would fuck something up for the 2nd Assistant Engineer and would leave him to come down earlier."

C. E. MICHELSON
Lt.(jg) USCGR
Examining Officer

When I relieved the watch at 12:00 Noon on the 13th of August, I made inquiries from the oiler I was relieving, Anthony Szymanski, why the oil in the forward Ind-1 was in proper condition. To this his reply was, "Fuck you." and the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, said, "I had to come topside, get help from the 1st Assistant Engineer and fill bearing with oil."

To: The Commandant (PMP)

When relieving watch at 12:00 Noon this same day the station was in proper order. Forwarded, approved.
The Chief Engineer, Richard L. White, called me to one side and said, "You oilers shouldn't fight among on another because that was what the Chief Engineer wanted so he could get more work out of us." I said, "I had to have my station in proper order for relief and that I felt that the Chief Engineer did too." Then Mr. White said, "If the other oiler was so particular about his station, why leaving a crowfoot with you enough all night to feel cool to the head when he was feeling the engine over while relieving the watch, that it would run hot and burn up after you are gone."

These are true statements and are made of my own free will without threats or promises by anyone.

Signed:

/s/ Robert L. ...

Witness to signatures:

/s/ E.S. Paley, Master S.S. Edward Livingston

(6)

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

August 22, 1944

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, Robert E. Van Clooster, oiler on above named vessel with to make the following statements:

Shortly after signing on board the ship the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, informed me that there were "pricks" aboard ship and to watch out.

While Clayton J. Richardson and myself were seated on # 5 hatch on the 18th of July, 1944 the time being approximately 6:00 P.M., the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, made a statement to Mr. Richardson and myself that if the Chief Engineer ever came down to the engine room and questioned him about the evaporator again that, Quote, "He'd take what ever he could find and smash the Chief Engineer's head in."

When relieving the watch at 12:00 Noon on August 15, 1944, the 2nd Assistant Engineer, George W. English, did not come down to relieve the watch until 12:00 Noon sharp. This made the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, angry and he said, "He would fuck something up for the 2nd Assistant Engineer and would learn him to come down earlier."

When I relieved the watch at 12:00 Midnight on the 17th of August, 1944, I made inquiries from the oiler I was relieving, Anthony Szyposz, why the oil in the forward circulator pump bearing was low and stated that I would not relieve the watch until it was in proper condition. To this his reply was, "Fuck you." and the 3rd Assistant Engineer gave him permission to leave. I then had to come topside, get keys from the 1st Assistant Engineer and fill bearing with oil.

When relieving watch at 12:00 Noon this same day the station was in proper order. The 3rd Assistant Engineer, Ricchard L. White, called me to one side and said, "You oilers shouldn't fight among on another because that was what the Chief Engineer wanted so he could get more work out of us." I said, "I had to have my station in proper order for relief and that I felt that the other oiler should too." Then Mr. White said, "If the other oiler was so particular, fuck him up by leaving a crosshead with just enough oil in it to feel cool to the hand when he was feeling the engine over while relieving the watch, that it would run hot and burn up after you are gone."

These are true statements and are made of my own free will without threats or promises by anyone.

Signed:

/s/ Robert E. Van Clooster

Witness to signature:

/s/ F.S. Raley, Master S.S. Edward Livingston

(11)

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

August 26, 1944

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, Clayton J. Richardson, wiper on board above named vessel with to make a statement.

While I was standing on grating above cylinder heads in engine room about 9:00 A.M. on above date heard the Third Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, tell the Chief Engineer, "You don't have any business to fuck around with his watch all the time and if I do he'll see about that" I saw him throw a pair of pliers down and further state, "Cocksaka, came over from the other side to run this country, but you will not run me."

This is a true statement and is made of my own free will without threats or promises from any one.

statement to Mr. Van Clooster and myself that if the Chief Engineer ever came down in the engine room and questioned him about the evaporator again, that, quote "He'd take what ever he could find and smash the Chief Engineer's head in."

Signed:

/s/C.J. Richardson

Witness to signature:

/s/ F.S. Raley

Master

These are true statements and made of my own free will without threats or promises by anyone.

Signed: /s/ F.S. Raley

Witness to signature:

/s/ F.S. Raley

Master

S.S. Edward Livingston

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

AUGUST 22, 1944

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, Clayton J. Richardson, wiper on board above named vessel wish to make the following statements:

Shortly after being signed on board ship, I was informed by the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White that the 2nd Assistant Engineer, George W. English, was a stool pigeon and ran to the Chief Engineer with everything and to watch out for him.

While Robert E. Van Clooster and myself were seated on # 5 hatch on the 18th of July, 1944 the time being approximately 6:00 P.M., the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, made a statement to Mr. Van Clooster and myself that if the Chief Engineer ever came down in the engine room and questioned him about the evaporator again, that, quote, "He'd take what ever he could find and smash the Chief Engineer's head in."

On August 7, 1944 during the time that the 8 to 12 watch was on duty, I saw the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White taste the water that was coming from the evaporator and going into the fresh water tank. In a few minutes I casually walked by and tasted the water and found it salty. This salty water continued to flow into the fresh water tank for about 20 minutes before Mr. White removed the pipe from the tank and stopped the flow. This salted up the entire fresh water tank of 40 Tons.

While I am performing the duties assigned by the Chief Engineer and when the 3rd Assistant Engineer, Mr. White, is on watch he calls the other wiper John J. Sullivan, who is to help me, away from his duties to talk and laugh with him under the ventilator.

These are true statements and made of my own free will without threats or promises by anyone.

Signed: /s/ C.J. Richardson

Witness to signature:

/s/ F.S. Raley

Master

S.S. Edward Livingston

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

August 26, 1944

August 23, 1944

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

I, Anton G. Solman, fireman on board above named vessel wish to make a statement:

When relieving the 8 to 12 watch I have found the extra feed water valve jammed 4 or 5 times. On August 1, 1944 I refused to relieve the watch because this valve was jammed and the fuel oil discharge strainer lugs were tightened to extreme and also battered. The discharge strainer was left in a dangerous condition because it was not put together properly. I informed the fireman on watch that I would not relieve the watch with conditions as they are and he replied, "Go fuck your self," and walked off. I reported this to the Third Assistant Engineer, Richard L. White, and he secured the strainer so that I could take over the relief. While doing this the Third Assistant said, "I don't care what the fireman does on my watch let the Second Assistant Engineer worry."

This is a true statement made of my own free will without threats or promises from anyone.

Signed:

Signed:

N. Schurgen Anton Solman
Chief Engineer

Witness to signature:

/s/ F. S. Raley
Master

ON BOARD S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTON

August 26, 1944

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

At 9:00 A.M. on this date I went down in the engine room and found the Third Assistant, Richard L. White, standing under the port side ventilator. On checking the evaporator I found the shell pressure above 12 lbs. and asked him why he was carrying high pressure when instructions were to carry 7 to 8 lbs. He replied that the pressure would be down. I then instructed he and the oiler on watch to take the plugs out of H.P. and L. P. eccentric pans and drain emulsified oil out and refill with fresh water. The Third Assistant Engineer then asked where the wiper was. I asked him what he wanted the wiper for and his reply was that he wanted him to clean the pans. I then informed him that what I requested was an order and they were to do the work. Without any answer he went to dynamo platform and started to fool around dynamo. I called him back and asked him why he did not do as I had instructed. To this he replied, "You don't have any business to fuck around with his watch all the time and if I do he'll see about that." He threw tools around and further stated, "Cocksaka, came over from the other side to run this country, but you will not run me."

This a true statement of the facts as stated.

Signed:

N. Schurgel
Chief Engineer

Witness to signature:

F.S. Raley
Master

SPECIAL REPORT

Confidential

P.S.O. Shatt al Arab Area
O i/c 73 F.S. Section

BGF/GR/189

From: G.J. Rees Cpl F.S. BGF

Subject: Report on incidents aboard S.S. EDWARD LIVINGSTONE.

When this ship was vetted no complaints were made against any of the crew. From various conversations with the crew FS gathered that there was some trouble aboard this vessel. Due to the reluctance of people to talk, no definite line of action could be adopted. The signal mentioned in the vetting report from BAHREIN, dated 25 August 44 was not received in this Office, and consequently no action could be taken until the arrival of a copy of the vetting report on 1 September 44. The Master was once more seen and was under the impression that only the Coast Guards could help in this matter.

He was persuaded to allow FS to see the statements made, and further acquainted FS with the fact that the 3rd Assistant desired to sign off the ship. The 3rd Assistant was not on board and FS failed to see him that day. The Master was referred to the N.C.I.C. BGF, who contacted the AMERICAN NAVAL OBSERVER, and it was arranged to sign RICHARD LACY WHITE, the 3rd Engineer, off the ship. He was signed off by mutual consent on 2 September 44, and proceeded to KHORRAMSHAHR.

FS was not convinced that the trouble had been disposed of, and further investigations were carried out.

(a) WHITE, RICHARD LACY. bn HANNIBAL MO. 10 March 21
Home Address 137 W Main St. Amsterdam N.Y.
SPT No. 44739 issd. Washington 15 Sept. 42
SCI No. Z 272455 issd. New York 19 August 42.
Engineers' License No. 16486 issd. New London Conn. 30:5:44

This man was previously employed by his father as a machinist, but joined the Merchant Navy shortly after America's entry into the war. This is his first trip as an Officer Engineer. As far as he knows there have been no complaints from any previous officers regarding either his work or conduct. His name was checked against MM SL and US BL, but he was not mentioned in either. If he is such a desperate character as he is made out to be it is rather peculiar that he has not been black listed in two years. He stated that this was the first trip that he had been unhappy on, and this was simply because the Chief Engineer, Nicolas Schurgel, 009938, did not like him. The Chief Engineer's dislike of the man was amply corroborated by other members of the crew, both officers and men. The Third Assistant Engineer was popular with the majority of the crew in spite of his very quick temper. The 2nd Assistant, George W. English, Z-252267, on this ship, has no license, and to keep well in with the Chief Engineer he used to collect from the men on his watch various statements made by the 3rd Assistant, and report to the Chief Engineer. This did not improve relations between the two men. The 2nd Assistant's activities were known and condemned by the members of the crew spoken to by FS.

In answer to the charge made against him in the Chief Engineer's statement that "he went to the dynamo platform and started to fool around with the dynamo" the 3rd Assistant stated that he had to go to the dynamos to switch over from No. 2 to No. 3 as No. 2 had been "left hot from the previous watch" and there was danger of it burning out. The same statement was made by ANTHONY SZYPOSZ, oiler, Z-434087, on this watch who was seen separately and after the 3rd Assistant had left the ship. Szyposz further states that the dynamos were continually running hot after the 2nd Assistant's Watch. He stated that

7) ENCLOSURE (B)

Assistant never had any trouble as he lubricated the machines regularly during his watch. Also, he had been responsible for keeping the dynamos going and he knew this side of engineering particularly well.

White stated that the Chief Engineer was continually after him, especially concerning the 'evaporator'. The charge made against him of salting the water tank was denied, and he stated that the Chief Engineer was responsible for this. He tasted the water in the tank and got two other men to do so. They all agreed but the Chief Engineer stated that it was not salty. White possessed a very quick temper, and this coupled with the fact that this was his first trip as an officer, and his anxiety not to lose his license which he was convinced the Chief Engineer was bent on getting him to do, made him more vulnerable than usual.

White's statement that the Chief Engineer's English was not very good was also noticed by FS, and this is especially so when he gets excited. He seems to have been in this condition more often than not when he spoke to the 3rd Assistant, who decided to sign off the vessel in case he would be deprived of his license.

A diary of incidents kept by the 3rd Assistant was shown to FS, and is enclosed. The Log Entry mentioned was seen by FS. This entry was made in SUEZ and the case was dismissed due to insufficient evidence. The Master stated that it was not the fireman's fault entirely, and other members of the engine room stated that he was one of the best firemen that they had sailed with.

The men who made the signed statements were then seen and after conversation with them, it was clear that they would not have made these statements of their own free will. ROBERT E VAN CLOOSTER went as far as to ask FS if he could withdraw his statement. All statements were made under veiled threats from the 2nd Assistant and the Chief Engineer, but the Master was unaware of this.

(b) ROBERT E VAN CLOOSTER: (Oiler, Z-470034)

When asked how he remembered the dates and times so exactly, he said that he had only supplied the approximately dates and the Chief Engineer had fixed them, or suggested to him the exact dates. He is a conscientious man and kept out of trouble with the Chief Engineer by doing exactly as he is told whether this is right or wrong. It was suggested to him that he had better sign these statements so that he would be cleared if anything did happen to the engines. When he had time to think it over he realized that he had not conveyed the impression that he wanted to in his statement. He said that the 3rd Assistant said most of these things when he was in a temper. Clooster agreed that White was a really efficient engineer, and that no complaints could be made about the state of the engine room when he left it after his watch.

The whole affair had been kept secret from the rest of the crew, and not once to his knowledge had the 3rd Engineer been confronted by these charges. He further stated that the crew were continually threatened by the Chief Engineer with logging and being either put in a "military concentration camp" or in the army. Although the Chief Engineer continually visited the engine room during the 3rd Assts. watch he never came below during the 2nd Assts. Watch.

(c) CLAYTON J. RICHARDSON (Wiper, Z-340505)

When asked how much water was in the tank when the 3rd Asst. allowed it to become salty he said that he did not know. FS pointed out that he had signed a statement to the effect that there was 40 tons in the tank. In a later conversation with the Chief Engineer FS found that this statement had been made by the Chief Engineer. This man was rather illiterate, and was obviously a stool-pigeon for the Chief Engr.

FRANK G SOLMAN (F.W.T. Z-434086)

When asked to make a statement, this man was told that he would have to appear in court whether he made a statement or not. He stated that the third Engr. always left his watch in good order. The strainer referred to in the statement was worn down and was later fixed by the 1st Asst. and not by the 2nd Asst. whose job it was. His statement does not convey what he really thought. It consists of incidents that had been dug up to the detriment of the 3rd Engr. He thought that the 3rd Engr. was a capable and efficient officer.

(e) NICHOLAS SCHURGEL (Chief Engineer)

CDB No. 009938 isssd. New York, N. Y., n o date.

He stated that the 3rd Assistant was not a good engineer and that his conduct was not good. When asked if he had threatened men he admitted that he had on some occasions, but only when he thought that it was necessary. He had been to sea continuously for a very long period. He stated that he did not like the 3rd Asst. and could not get on with him.

(f) HENRY KALINOWSKI (3rd Mate. 028222)

This officer was on the same watch as the 3rd Asst. and stated that he had received every cooperation from the engine room. He could not find any fault with the way that the engine room had responded to all his demands. He stated that it was mostly the Chief Engineer's fault that there was so much friction on the ship. He could never get a job done to his satisfaction, and was continually using threats. The 2nd Mate and the 1st Assistant Engineer corroborated this statement.

FS is of the opinion that the 3rd Engineer is not blameless, but the Chief Engineer is more to blame for the disaffection on the ship. The 3rd Asst. would not stand for what most of the others were doing and this was the reason why the Chief Engineer took a particular dislike to him. The methods used by the Chief Engineer to get work done was most unsavory, and most of the crew were so frightened of "concentration camps" and logging that they did not complain. The Master was therefore not fully acquainted with the situation as he had only heard the Chief Engineer's side of the story.

Bandar Shahpur

4 August 1944

Richard L. White, 3rd Asst.
/s/ G. J. Rees,Cpl.

7/26/44

Abusive and obscene language used by the Chief Engineer. Asked for a packing hook and replied with an insult of "Where do you think it is, in my pocket? God damn it look for it". Refused to give me the keys to the tool room to look for packing hooks. Asked again; more abusive language. Then I told him to speak to me like a man or I would report him to the Captain of the ship and the Coast Guard.

Richard L. White, 3rd Asst.

7/18/44

I was told to hook a drop light from a plug by the Chief Engineer. When it was hooked up, due to a misunderstanding, due to his impediment of speech, it was hooked up to the wrong plug. Then was showered with abusive language. At 10 A.M. called the Master to come to the Engine Room and settle the argument between the Chief Engineer and myself. Master came down in the Engine room at about 10:45 A.M. and had a discussion between the three of us. I requested to be paid off in the next port of Call and also requested the Master to try and have the Chief Eng. change his way of running the Engine room because he is running the engineers and all of the crew slowly insane. Later was told to carry 115 # steam pressure on Evaporator & 5# shell pressure and 3/4 glass of water. Wasn't enough pressure so the Evaporator began to run salt. Was abused for carrying out orders. Later was abused for letting the oiler ring two bells too loud. This is for the relief always rang at 10 minutes of the hour for the relief watch.

Richard L. White, 3rd Asst.

7/19/44

Superheater relief valve gasket blew out at 12:50 P.M. endangering the safety of the crew and the vessel. Also the Convoy by not stopping to repair it is now 7/25/44. No repairs to it as yet still blowing and weakening the steam line flange leading to the safety valve.

Richard L. White, 3rd Asst.

8/4/44

Pushing boiler above its danger point causing the makeshift gasket to blow again when it was unnecessary. Then logged fireman. Testimony in the log is a false statement. I warned him (the Chief Engineer) that the boiler was going to blow off twice. But the warning went unheeded. Fireman refused to lower pressure and light off fires. But fireman did as he was told, then the Chief continued to yell and scream at him until the fireman replied, "This isn't the first ship I ever fired on". After popping the boiler off, the ship still didn't smoke. Then was called by the bridge requesting smoke. The Chief Engineer claims my method of making smoke was not satisfactory; that is it wasn't enough. But two days before the 8-12 watch was complimented by their smoke screen by the Naval lieutenant and 3rd Mate and 2nd Radio operator, saying it was the best smoke screen we ever had, and also the best in the convoy.

(10) ENCLOSURE (C)