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INTELLIGENCE REPORT

Serial 190 = 43 Monograph Index Guide No. 505-100
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-43, 2-43) (To correspond with SUBJECT given below, See O. N. I. Index Guide. Make separate report for each main title.)

From U.S. Naval Attache, at Montevideo, Uruguay Date July 30, 1943
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station, or person)

Reference Encl. (A) of ALJISNA's ltr. of 7/29/43 to VCNO, EW3-11(UY)/A16-3
(Directive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)

Source Personal Interview Evaluation C-2
(As official, personal observation, publication, press, conversation with—
Identify when practicable, etc.) A-1 to E-0 etc.
AM/EN 2-10; SER. 431246-11-18-42

Subject United States Merchant Marine S.S. Mornac Swan
(Nation reported on) (Main title as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF.—(Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctly stated; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

On 8 July, 1943, the SS Mornac Swan rescued 4 survivors. Failure to use "NUMS" method of radio contact presumed to have caused failure of attempt to make Radio Survivor Report.

On 8 July, 1943, the SS Mornac Swan, Lt. A. Berg Master, picked up four survivors from the torpedoed British ship Hoi-Hoi, sunk without warning on the 2 July. The following night an effort was made both on short and long wave to contact either Aden or Simonstown to make the report on survivors as per CAMSI. No contact was made. In the opinion of this office the failure to contact a shore station was due to the fact that the NUMS system of making contact was not used.

On the trip from Bandashapur to Montevideo the vessel was a hundred miles out of position several times, according to the Captain and the armed guard officer. No report was made on this. The reason for not making a report was that the radio could not contact shore stations according to the Captain. He stated that no effort was made to effect a contact to report being out of position.

Correct and full instructions as to the hundred miles out of position report as well as instructions as to the use of NUMS were included in the routing instructions from Bandashapur. Neither of the Navy radio operators aboard had ever seen any instructions on the use of NUMS. It was not possible to interview the merchant marine radio operator as the ship left for Buenos Aires the evening of the day the above data were developed.

Captain Berg stated that in his opinion it was of little use to keep track of where a ship was as no one on shore knew where the submarines were. He stated that when making the Atlantic run last year he was merely told by the Naval authorities to "get there" and not to bother about reports.

Due to the above facts and as a result of an interview with the four survivors held here at this office it is felt that the failure of the

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Captain ~~to~~ use his radio properly when attempting to make the survivor report may have resulted in the loss of life. Two hundred and twenty passengers and crew were on the Hol-How when sunk.

The Captain and Navy radio operators were thoroughly instructed in the use of NUNES by this office.

In so far as the Captain's lack of familiarity with AMSI and CAMSI is concerned, this instance is typical of approximately 75% of the masters of U.S. merchant vessels calling at Montevideo. These masters either fail to realize or refuse to realize the importance of these publications. Unfortunately, several U.S. masters have indicated that they have paid little attention to AMSI and CAMSI because they are British publications.

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